Abstract. In this paper, we show that identification schemes (ID-schemes) are very powerful in some areas of cryptography. We first prove an equivalence between non-interactive trapdoor commitment schemes and a natural class of identification schemes. We next propose a more efficient on-line/off-line signature transformation than Shamir-Tauman. As an application, we present a variant of Boneh-Boyen (BB) signature scheme which is not only on-line/off-line but also has a smaller public key size than the original BB scheme. Finally, we present the first identity-based ID-scheme which is secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attack without random oracles by using our variant of BB signature scheme.
Introduction

Background
A commitment scheme consists of two phases: in the commit phase, a sender commits to a message, while in the decommit phase, the sender reveals the committed message. A trapdoor commitment scheme admits a trapdoor whose knowledge allows to open a commitment in any possible way. Gennaro generalized trapdoor commitment schemes to multi-trapdoor commitment schemes [12] . A multi-trapdoor commitment scheme is a family of secure trapdoor commitment schemes such that it admits a master trapdoor whose knowledge allows to open any commitment in the family in any possible way. He also showed a compiler which transforms any proof of knowledge (identification scheme) into one which is secure against the concurrent man-in-the-middle attack, where the compiler needs a multi-trapdoor commitment scheme and a strong one-time signature scheme in addition. We can thus have the following relationship:
ID-scheme + multi-trapdoor commitment + strong one-time signature → ID-scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attack.
On the other hand, the notion of on-line/off-line signature schemes was introduced by Even et al. [9] . The on-line phase of this kind of signatures can be made very fast due to the pre-computation of the off-line phase. Shamir and Tauman showed how to transform a non-adaptively secure signature scheme to an adaptively secure on-line/off-line signature scheme by using trapdoor commitment schemes [25] . That is, Non-adaptive signature + trapdoor commitment → Adaptive on-line/off-line signature (1) This result is important because there exist only a few adaptively secure signature schemes in the standard model: Cramer-Shoup scheme [8] and GennaroHalevi-Rabin scheme [13] under the strong RSA assumption, and Boneh-Boyen scheme [1] under the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption. Meanwhile, the idea of identity (ID)-based cryptography was formulated by Shamir [24] in 1984. An ID-based scheme is an asymmetric system wherein the public key is effectively replaced by a user's publicly available identity information or any arbitrary string which derived from the user's identity. It enables any pair of users to communicate securely without exchanging public or private keys and without keeping any key directories. Many ID-based schemes appeared in the literature since then, for example ID-based encryption schemes [4, 2, 3] , ID-based signature schemes [21, 16, 7] , etc.
The notion of ID-based identifications was formalized in Kurosawa and Heng [18] and Bellare et al. [6] independently. All the ID-based ID-schemes presented in the above two papers are provably secure in the random oracle model only. Provably secure ID-based ID-schemes in the standard model were first appeared in [19] , but they are not secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attack. In this paper, we propose the first ID-based ID-scheme which is provably secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attack in the standard model.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we show that identification schemes (ID-schemes) are very powerful in some areas of cryptography.
We first prove an equivalence between non-interactive trapdoor commitment schemes and a natural class of identification schemes. This class includes Schnorr scheme [23] , GQ scheme [15] , Fiat-Shamir scheme [11] and the 2 -th root scheme [26] .
Next, we show a more efficient transformation from a non-adaptively secure signature to an adaptively secure on-line/off-line signature than equation (1) by directly employing the canonical ID-scheme as a tool. The proposed transformation requires lesser memory in the off-line phase than Shamir-Tauman transformation [25] which is indicated by equation (1)).
Additionally, we present an on-line/off-line variant of Boneh-Boyen signature scheme (BB scheme) [1] as an example of the above transformation. The proposed scheme is not only on-line/off-line, but also the public key size is smaller than that of the original BB scheme. Although a similar scheme can be obtained by applying Shamir-Tauman transformation, our scheme, however, requires lesser memory in the off-line phase.
Finally, we present the first ID-based ID-scheme which is provably secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attack in the standard model, deriving from our proposed variant of BB signature scheme.
All our results hold without relying on the random oracle heuristic. In the random oracle model, it is well-known that a canonical identification scheme can be transformed to a signature scheme by using the Fiat and Shamir technique [11] . Many signature schemes are obtained by this transformation [10, 15, 23, 20 ].
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review some preliminaries. In Section 3, we prove the equivalence between identification scheme and trapdoor commitment scheme. In Section 4, we present a general transformation from any non-adaptively secure signature to the adaptively secure on-line/off-line signature by employing a canonical ID-scheme as a tool. In Section 5, we exhibit a concrete example by applying the above transformation to Boneh-Boyen signature scheme. In Section 6, we propose the first ID-based ID-scheme which is secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attack in the standard model. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, denotes the security parameter and a PPT algorithm denotes a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm.
Identification Scheme
In an identification scheme (ID-scheme), a prover P proves to a verifier V that she knows a witness s I related to a public instance p I . A canonical ID-scheme can be formalized by ID = (G ID , Commit, Response, Check), where G ID is a PPT algorithm which generates (p I , s I ). Commit , Response and Check are algorithms which specify the protocol (P, V ) as follows.
Step 1. P chooses r at random from a certain domain Cmt and computes x = Commit(r). P then sends x to V . Step 2. V chooses a challenge c at random from a certain set Cha and sends it to P . Step 3. P computes a response y = Response(s I , r, c) and sends y to V . Let Res denote the set of possible y for p I .
V accepts P if and only if equation (2) holds.
The above protocol (P, V ) is often called a Σ-protocol. We say that (x, c, y) is a valid transcript for p I if it satisfies equation (2). Definition 1. We say that ID is a Σ-ID-scheme if the following holds:
Completeness. Pr(equation (2) holds) = 1. Special Soundness. It is hard to compute two valid transcripts (x, c, y) and (x, c , y ) such that c = c on input p I . y-Uniformity. For any fixed (s I , c), y = Response(s I , r, c) is uniformly distributed over Res if r is uniformly distributed over Cmt.
It is easy to see that y-uniformity implies that the protocol (P, V ) is honestverifier zero-knowledge. All the important identification schemes in cryptographic applications are Σ-ID-schemes.
Trapdoor Commitment Scheme
A trapdoor commitment scheme is defined by T C = (G T C , Tcom, Topen). G T C is a PPT algorithm which generates (pk, tk), where pk is the public key and tk is the trapdoor.
Tcom is the algorithm that computes a commitment on m as x = Tcom(pk, m, r), where r is a random number. To open the commitment x, the sender reveals m, r and the receiver recomputes x.
Topen is the algorithm that opens a commitment in any possible way with the trapdoor tk. For given m, r and m = m, it outputs r = Topen(tk, m, r, m ) such that x = Tcom(pk, m, r) = Tcom(pk, m , r ).
This implies that the receiver has no information on m given x. We require that the sender cannot find a collision such as follows.
Definition 2. We say that a trapdoor commitment scheme T C is secure if it is hard to compute (m, r) and (m , r ) such that Tcom(m, r) = Tcom(m , r ) on input pk where m = m .
An example of trapdoor commitment scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption [22] is shown in Appendix A.
Signature Scheme
A signature scheme is denoted by Ω = (G sign , Sign, Verify). G sign is a PPT algorithm which generates (vk, sk), where vk is a verification key and sk is the secret key. Sign is a PPT algorithm which generates a signature σ on input a message m and the secret key sk. Verify is a polynomial time algorithm which checks the validity of (m, σ) by using vk, say Verify(vk, m, σ) = accept or reject.
Adaptive Security. The standard security notion of signature schemes is existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack [14] . It is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A:
1. The challenger runs G sign to obtain (vk, sk). A is given vk. 2. A queries some message m i to the challenger for i = 1, . . . , t adaptively. The challenger responds to each query with a signature σ i = Sign(sk, m i ). 3. Eventually, A outputs a forgery (m * , σ * ). A wins the game if m * ∈ {m 1 , . . . , m t } and Verify(vk, m * , σ * ) = accept.
We say that Ω is adaptively secure if Pr(A wins) is negligible for any PPT adversary A as shown above.
Non-Adaptive Security. A much weaker security notion is existential unforgeability against weak non-adaptive chosen message attack. It is defined using the following game between a challenger and an adversary A: We say that Ω is non-adaptively secure if Pr(A wins) is negligible for any PPT adversary A as shown above.
There is another notion called one-time signature, informally this means that the adversary A is given the verification key vk and the signature σ on a message m of her choice (chosen after seeing vk), then it is infeasible for A to compute the signature of a different message, say (m * , σ * ) such that m * = m. A strong one-time signature scheme means that it is infeasible for A to also generate (m * , σ * ) such that (m * , σ * ) = (m, σ).
3 Equivalence between ID and T C
We say that a Σ-ID-scheme is reversible if there exists a polynomial time algorithm Reverse which computes r such that
from p I , s I , c and y. All the important identification schemes in cryptographic applications are reversible Σ-ID-schemes. For example, we have a look at the famous Schnorr ID-scheme [23] . Suppose that the Schnorr ID-scheme is defined as ID = (G ID , Commit, Response, Check). Let G be a group of prime order q and g be the generator of G. G ID is a PPT algorithm which generates (p I , s I ) = (g s , s) where s is randomly chosen from Z q . Commit , Response and Check are algorithms which specify the protocol (P, V ) as follows.
Step 1. P chooses r at random from Z q and computes x = Commit(r) = g r . P then sends x to V .
Step 2. V chooses a challenge c at random from Z q and sends it to P .
Step
Thus, it is not difficult to see that the Schnorr ID-scheme is a Σ-ID-scheme since it satisfies all the conditions in Definition 1. It is also a reversible Σ-IDscheme since there exists a polynomial time algorithm Reverse which computes r such that
given g s , s, c and y. That is, r can be computed from equation (3) via r = y − cs mod q.
Next, we prove that non-interactive trapdoor commitment schemes are equivalent to reversible Σ-ID-schemes. Proof. We first prove that a reversible Σ-ID-scheme implies a trapdoor commitment scheme. Suppose that there exists a reversible Σ-ID-scheme. We then construct a trapdoor commitment scheme T C = (G T C , Tcom, Topen) as follows. Let H be a collision-resistant hash function. Let G T C = G ID . That is, the key pair of T C is given by (pk, tk) = (p I , s I ), where (p I , s I ) ← G ID (1 ).
(Commitment) For a message m, let x = Tcom(pk, m, y) = Check(p I , H(m), y), where y is chosen at random. That is, we consider an execution of ID on input p I such that x is a commit, H(m) is a challenge and y is a response.
(Trapdoor) Suppose that m, y and m = m are given. Then we compute y such that x = Check(p I , H(m), y) = Check(p I , H(m ), y ) as follows. By using Reverse, compute r such that x = Commit(r) from p I , s I , H(m) and y. Then let y = Response(s I , r, H(m )).
(Security) The above T C is secure from the special soundness of ID.
Theorem 2.
If there exists a trapdoor commitment scheme, then there exists a reversible Σ-ID-scheme.
Proof. We prove that a trapdoor commitment scheme implies a reversible Σ-ID-scheme. Suppose that there exists a trapdoor commitment scheme T C = (G T C , Tcom, Topen). We then construct a reversible Σ-ID-scheme as follows. Let H be a collision-resistant hash function.
Let G ID = G T C . That is, let (p I , s I ) = (pk, tk). Let x = Commit(R) = Tcom(p I , m, r), where R = (m, r) is randomly chosen.
From R = (m, r) and a given challenge c, compute y such that
by using the trapdoor key tk. Let Response(tk, R, c) = y. Define Check(p I , c, y) = Tcom(p I , c, y). We show that the above scheme is a reversible Σ-ID-scheme. It is easy to see that Pr(equation (2) holds) = 1. The special soundness holds from the security of T C. The y-uniformity is clearly satisfied. Finally, we need to show Reverse which computes R = (m, r) such that
from tk, c and y. From our definition of Commit and Check, the above equation is written as Tcom(p I , m, r) = Tcom(p I , c, y). Next, Reverse chooses r at random and computes r which satisfies the above equation by using tk. This completes the proof.
New On-line/Off-line Signature Scheme
The notion of on-line/off-line signature schemes was introduced by Even et al. [9] . In these schemes, the on-line phase of the signing algorithm is made very fast due to the pre-computation in the off-line phase. Shamir and Tauman showed how to transform a non-adaptively secure signature scheme to an on-line/offline signature scheme which is adaptively secure by using trapdoor commitment schemes [25] .
In this section, we show a more efficient transformation which requires lesser memory than Shamir-Tauman transformation by directly using Σ-ID-schemes instead of using our equivalence of Section 3 (see Table 1 ).
Proposed Transformation
Let Ω = (G sign , Sign, Verify) be a non-adaptively secure signature scheme. Let ID = (G ID , Commit, Response, Check) be a Σ-ID-scheme, where Cha is the set of challenges and Res is the set of responses. Let H : {0, 1} * → Cha be a collision-resistant hash function.
Then our on-line/off-line signature scheme is constructed as follows.
1. Off-line phase: Choose r ∈ Cmt randomly and compute x = Commit(r). For x, compute σ = Sign(sk, x) and store (r, σ). 2. On-line phase: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , the on-line phase proceeds as follows. Retrieve (r, σ) Note that the on-line phase is efficient because it computes only y = Response(s I , r, H(m)).
Theorem 3. The above signature scheme Ω is adaptively secure if Ω is nonadaptively secure and ID is a Σ-ID-scheme.
Proof. Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary A for Ω such that Pr(A wins) is non-negligible in the adaptive chosen message attack. Then we show that Ω is not non-adaptively secure or ID is not a Σ-ID-scheme.
The challenger gives vk = (vk, p I ) to A as the verification key. Assume that A queries messages m i to the challenger and the challenger returns signature σ = (σ i , y i ) for i = 1, . . . , t. Eventually, A outputs a forgery m * and z = (σ * , y
. . , t. We then distinguish two types of forgeries, Type-1 in which x * = x j for some j, and Type-2 in which x * = x i for any i. Type-1 forgery or type-2 forgery occurs with non-negligible probability.
(Type-1 forgery) In this case, we show a PPT algorithm M which breaks the special soundness of ID. On input p I , M behaves as follows.
1. M runs G sign to obtain (vk, sk). M then acts as a challenger and sends vk = (vk, p I ) to A. 2. M simulates the challenger of A as follows. Suppose that A asks for a signature on m i . Then M chooses y i ∈ Res randomly and computes x i = Check(p I , H(m i ), y i ). M next computes σ i = Sign(sk, x i ) by using sk and returns a signature σ i = (σ i , y i ) to A. 3. Eventually, A returns a valid forgery m * and z = (σ * , y * ) such that m * = m j and x * = x j for some j.
M then outputs two valid transcripts (x * (= x j ), H(m * ), y * ) and (x j , H(m j ), y j ) for p I . Note that H(m * ) = H(m j ) with overwhelming probability because m * = m j and H is collision-resistant. This means that M breaks the special soundness of ID.
(Type-2 forgery) In this case, we show a PPT adversary B that breaks Ω by non-adaptive chosen message attack. On input 1 , B behaves as follows.
1. M runs G ID to obtain (p I , s I ). For i = 1, . . . , t, B chooses r i ∈ Cmt randomly and computes x i = Commit(r i ). B sends x 1 , . . . , x t as messages to its challenger. 2. The challenger runs G sign to obtain (vk, sk). It computes σ i = Sign(sk, x i ) for i = 1, . . . , t. It then returns vk, σ 1 , . . . , σ t to B. 3. B runs A on input vk = (vk, p I ). 4. M simulates the challenger of A as follows. Suppose that A asks for a signature on m i . Then B computes y i = Response(s I , r i , H(m i )) by using s I and returns a signature σ i = (σ i , y i ) to A. 5. Eventually, A returns a valid forgery m * and z = (σ * , y * ) such that x * = x i for any i because it is a type-2 forgery.
B then outputs a forgery (x * , σ * ). Now B wins because x * = x i for any i and σ * is a valid signature on x * . This completes the proof.
Comparison
Shamir-Tauman [25] showed a transformation using trapdoor commitment schemes T C = (G T C , Tcom, Topen) as follows.
Let Ω = (G sign , Sign, Verify) be a non-adaptively secure signature scheme. A secret key of the on-line/off-line signature scheme is (sk, tk), where sk is a secret key of Ω and tk is a trapdoor key of T C. The public key is (vk, pk), where vk is a verification key of Ω and pk is a public key of T C.
1. Off-line phase: Choose a random message m and a random number r . Compute hash = Tcom(pk, m , r ) and σ = Sign(sk, hash). Then store (m , r , σ). 2. On-line phase: Given a message m, the on-line phase proceeds as follows. Retrieve (m , r , σ) from the memory. By using tk, find r such that Tcom(pk, m, r) = Tcom(pk, m , r ). Let σ = (σ, r) be a signature of m.
Now in Shamir-Tauman scheme, the off-line phase must store (m , r , σ). On the other hand, our off-line phase stores only (r, σ). Hence our memory size is smaller if |r| = |r |. In this section, we show an on-line/off-line variant of BB signature scheme as an application of our transformation. The proposed scheme is not only online/off-line, but also the public key size is smaller than that of BB scheme while the other parameters are of the same size. A similar scheme can be obtained by using Shamir-Tauman transformation. Our scheme, however, requires lesser memory in the off-line phase as shown in Table 1 .
BB Signature Scheme
Let (G 1 , G 2 ) be bilinear groups such that |G 1 | = |G 2 | = p, where p is a prime. Let e : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a pairing, where |G T | = p. Let g 1 be a generator of G 1 and g 2 be a generator of G 2 . Let H : {0, 1} * → Z * p be a collision-resistant hash function.
The basic BB scheme is non-adaptively secure under the strong DH assumption. A verification key is v(= g α 2 ), where α ∈ Z q is the secret key. For a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , a signature is given by σ = g
The full BB scheme is adaptively secure under the same assumption. A verification key is u(= g · v r ) = e(g 1 , g 2 ).
Proposed On-line/Off-line Signature Scheme
We now apply our transformation of Section 4.1 to the basic BB scheme Ω and Schnorr identification scheme. Let H : {0, 1} * → Z * p and H : G 1 → Z * p be two collision-resistant hash functions.
Key generation. Choose α ∈ Z p randomly and compute v = g α 2 . Let g 1 be a generator of G 1 . Choose s ∈ Z p randomly and compute w = g 1 −s . Let (v, w) be a verification key and (α, s) be the secret key. Note that (v, α) is a key-pair of the basic BB scheme and (w, s) is a key-pair of Schnorr identification scheme.
Signing.
1. Off-line phase: Choose r ∈ Z p randomly and compute x = g 1 r . For x, com-
and store (r, σ). (Note that σ is a signature on x in the basic BB scheme.) 2. On-line phase: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1} * , the on-line phase proceeds as follows. Retrieve (r, σ) from the memory. Compute y = r + sH(m) mod p. Let σ = (σ, y) be a signature of m.
Verification. Given (m, σ, y), first compute x = g 1 y w H(m) . Next by using x, verify that
Theorem 4. The above on-line/off-line signature scheme is adaptively secure under strong DH assumption in the standard model.
Proof. The basic BB scheme is non-adaptively secure under strong DH assumption [1] and Schnorr scheme is a Σ-ID-scheme under the discrete logarithm assumption. Therefore, from Theorem 3, the above signature scheme is adaptively secure under strong DH assumption.
Note that the on-line phase computes only y = r + sH(m) mod p. Hence it is very efficient. Moreover, our scheme has a smaller verification key as shown below. In [5] , it is suggested to use an elliptic curve over GF (3 ) for G 1 and one over GF (3 6 ) for G 2 . Hence in our scheme, the verification key size is approximately a half of the full BB signature scheme as shown in the following table. Table 2 . BB Scheme and Our Variant verification key secret key signature Full BB scheme [1] u, v ∈ G 2 α, β ∈ Z p σ ∈ G 1 , r ∈ Z p Our scheme v ∈ G 2 , w ∈ G 1 α, s ∈ Z p σ ∈ G 1 , y ∈ Z p 6 ID-Based ID-Scheme without Random Oracles
The main differences of ID-based identification schemes from the usual identification schemes are that: (1) The adversary can choose a target identity ID of her choice to impersonate as opposed to a random public key; (2) The adversary can possess private keys of some users which she has chosen. The formal model of ID-based identification scheme was formalized in [18, 6] .
In this section, we show the first ID-based ID-scheme which is provably secure against man-in-the-middle attack in the standard model by using our variant of BB signature scheme in Section 5.2. By applying Gennaro's technique [12] to the BB on-line/off-line signature scheme, we manage to transform it to an ID-based ID-scheme secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle attack under the strong DH assumption.
Gennaro [12] : Σ-ID-scheme → Very secure ID-scheme Proposed: BB signature scheme → Very secure ID-based ID-scheme
Another Tool
We adopt the strong DH-based multi-trapdoor commitment scheme introduced by Gennaro into our construction since our BB on-line/off-line signature scheme is also based on the strong DH assumption.
